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1 Introduction 
European consensus (EuC) is an interpretative tool employed by the European Court of Human 
Rights (henceforth ‘the Court’) and constitutes a fundamental aspect of its decision-making 
process. At a time when the legitimacy of the Court as the ultimate arbiter of human rights 
protection in Europe is under challenge by many of the Contracting Parties to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’ or ‘the Convention’),1 consensus-based interpretation 
provides a useful means to legitimise the Court’s judgments and ensure their enforcement.2  
The justifications for the use of EuC and its contribution to the Court’s case law have been 
discussed extensively in the literature.3 The Court examines primarily individual applications4 
from the forty-seven Member States of the Council of Europe (CoE) and, as part of this 
mandate, is often called upon to resolve a variety of controversial and sensitive moral issues 
that range from the decriminalisation of homosexuality,5 to the rights of prisoners,6 in vitro 
fertilisation7 and assisted suicide.8 The Court has recognised that the Convention is a ‘living 
instrument’ that should be interpreted ‘in light of present day conditions’9 and has extended the 
protection provided under the ECHR to new areas that go beyond what the original drafters of 
the Convention envisioned. The Court also operates under the principle of subsidiarity, which 
determines its role as secondary to the institutions within the national legal orders of the 
Contracting Parties, which have the primary responsibility of implementing and interpreting 
the Convention, while also providing remedies for its violation.10 Therefore, it is hardly 
surprising that before taking a stance on sensitive moral issues, or before evolving the meaning 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Steering Committee for Human Rights, ‘CDDH report on the longer-term future of the system 
of the European Convention on Human Rights’ CDDH(2015)R84 available at 
www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/reformechr/CDDH%282015%29R84_Addendum%20I_EN-Final.pdf.  
2 On the relationship between consensus and legitimacy, see Fiona de Londras and Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, 
‘Managing judicial innovation in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 
523-49. 
3 See indicatively Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of 
Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 621; L. R. Helfer, 
‘Consensus, coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1993) 26 Cornell International Law 
Journal 133-65; Christos Rozakis, ‘The European judge as comparatist’ (2005) 80 Tulane Law Review 257-80. 
4 Articles 33 and 34 ECHR allow applications to the Court from Contracting Parties to the Convention (Inter-
State cases) and individuals. 
5 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (Appl. no. 7525/76), Judgment, 22 October 1981. 
6 Hirst v. United Kingdom (no. 2) (Appl. no. 74025/01), Judgment, 6 October 2005. 
7 Evans v. United Kingdom (Appl. no. 6339/05), Judgment, 10 April 2007. 
8 Pretty v. United Kingdom (Appl. no. 2346/02), Judgment, 29 April 2002. 
9 Tyrer v. United Kingdom (Appl. no. 5856/72), Judgment, 25 April 1978. 
10 Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks and Clare Ovey, Jacobs White and Ovey: The European Convention on 
Human Rights, 6th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 85. 
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of the ECHR, the Court takes into account developments in the CoE Member States11 to 
determine whether there is an emerging European approach that supports a specific, ‘novel’ 
interpretation of the Convention. This ensures the legitimacy of the Court’s judgments12 and is 
an added safeguard to guarantee that any novel interpretation of the Convention is not dictated 
by the Court to the Contracting Parties in a manner that does not consider the existence (or 
lack) of a EuC on the matter. 
In spite of its many advantages, the Court’s use of EuC has proven controversial in legal 
scholarship. Academic commentary has challenged the normative foundations of consensus,13 
while also noting discrepancies in its application that undermine its value as an interpretative 
tool.14 A specific objection against EuC, known in the literature as the ‘anti-majoritarian 
argument’,15 is the focal point of this chapter. This objection to EuC suggests that if the purpose 
of human rights protection is to provide a counter-majoritarian barrier to ‘the tyranny of the 
majority’, appeals to European majority opinion through a EuC analysis seem counterintuitive, 
if not outright problematic, when determining the rights of unpopular social groups and 
minorities.16  
This objection to the use of EuC is all the more relevant in discrimination cases under Article 
14 ECHR, where the applicants argue that they face unjustifiable obstacles to the enjoyment of 
a right due to their membership in a specific group.17 This raises a key question as to the 
appropriate contribution of EuC in this context. What role should the minority status of the 
applicant play when assessing the weight that will be placed on EuC?  
In response to this question, the chapter demonstrates that the minority status of an applicant 
has indeed provided the Court with the justification to assign lesser persuasive value to the 
existence or non-existence of EuC.18 However, it argues that this has been applied 
inconsistently across the Court’s case-law. The chapter will conclude that, if the Court accepts 
some value in limiting the role EuC plays in cases involving minorities, this must be applied 
uniformly across the Court’s jurisprudence. Alternatively, where the Court wishes to depart 
                                                          
11 EuC is only one type of consensus upon which the Court relies. Other types are ‘international consensus 
identified through international treaties; internal consensus in the respondent Contracting Party; expert 
consensus’; Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, ‘Does consensus matter? Legitimacy of European consensus in the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) Public Law 534-53 at 548. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See for instance, J.L. Murray, ‘Consensus: concordance, or hegemony of the majority?’, in Dialogues Between 
Judges (2008), available at www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Dialogue_2008_ENG.pdf. This point will be developed 
further in the following section. 
14 As Murray argues in his critique of EuC, ‘the consensus doctrine degenerates into an interpretive tool of such 
indeterminacy as to permit the court to exercise a freewheeling discretion in the interpretation of Convention 
rights’. See John L Murray, ‘The influence of the European Convention on Fundamental Rights on Community 
law’ (2011) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 1388-422 at1416. 
15 Murray, ‘Consensus’; J.A. Brauch, ‘The margin of appreciation and the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights: threat to the rule of law’ (2004) 11 Columbia Journal of European Law 113-50 at 146. 
16 These criticisms will be presented in more detail below.  
17 The Convention provides that discrimination is prohibited on the grounds of ‘sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth 
or other status’ in Article 14 ECHR.  
18 This will be developed in detail below. For a thorough examination of how the Court lessens the persuasive 
value of EuC in minority cases, see Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court 
of Human Rights, pp. 117-29. 
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from this approach in a specific case, it must provide convincing analysis in its reasoning as to 
why this is necessary.  
The chapter does not intend to provide a thorough overview of the Court’s case law on 
minorities. Instead, in order to better illustrate this disparity in the application of EuC amongst 
various minority groups, the chapter will rely on two case studies involving groups the Court 
has recognised as minorities.19 The case studies represent two radically different approaches in 
the use of EuC. First, the chapter will examine how EuC was used in cases involving the access 
of Roma children to education. These cases represent textbook examples of the Court relying 
on the minority status of the applicants to narrow the margin of appreciation of the respondent 
state and to bypass the solution to the problem that EuC would have dictated if it was applied 
to the facts of the case. This approach will be juxtaposed to same-sex marriage cases, in which 
the weight placed on EuC was not affected by the fact that the applicants were members of a 
‘sexual minority’,20 and the final outcome was determined almost exclusively based on the 
status of EuC on the matter.  
The chapter will be structured as follows. Part 2 examines the normative objections to the use 
of consensus in cases relating to minorities and identifies that the Court, in such cases, applies 
the EuC tool with greater flexibility. In light of this, Part 3 will assess whether this approach to 
EuC has been applied uniformly across different minorities. This section will examine the 
weight the Court placed on EuC first, when examining discrimination against Roma children, 
and second, in its same-sex marriage case-law. The focus will be placed on how the minority 
status of the applicants affected the application of EuC and the margin of appreciation. Based 
on the conclusions reached in part 3, Part 4 will argue that if the Court is willing to rely on the 
minority status of the applicant to avoid giving primacy to the EuC method of interpretation, it 
must do so consistently. This section will also suggest that more clarity must be provided as to 
the relationship between EuC and minorities in discrimination cases. Finally, this part will 
address potential objections to the arguments advanced in the chapter.  
 
2 Protection Versus Pragmatism: Normative Objections to the Application of Consensus 
in Cases Involving Minorities 
The issues surrounding the effective human rights protection of minorities are inherently 
controversial. Debates surrounding the appropriate role of judges in this context and their 
contribution to providing definitive answers on the scope of minority rights have been featured 
heavily in constitutional law scholarship. Two conflicting schools of thought have emerged on 
this issue. The first promotes the view that the judiciary should act to correct injustices 
perpetrated by majorities against ‘discrete and insular’21 minorities that may lack the capacity 
to participate equally in the democratic process.22 Under this analysis, the executive and 
                                                          
19 This point will be developed in the analysis below. 
20 X and others v. Austria (Appl. no. 19010/07), Judgment, 19 February 2013, para. 151.   
21 The term was employed by Justice Stone in the landmark US Supreme Court judgment of United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
22 See, for instance, Aharon Barak, ‘Foreword: a judge on judging: the role of a supreme court in a democracy’ 
(2002) 116 Harvard Law Review 16-162; Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: A Moral Reading of the American 
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legislative branches are viewed with suspicion as far as minority rights are concerned, as they 
are perceived as embodying majoritarian preferences.23 On the opposite end of the spectrum, 
there is ample literature questioning the democratic legitimacy of the judiciary to challenge 
democratically enacted legislation in a well-functioning democracy on the basis that it may 
violate rights.24 Jeremy Waldron, for instance, famously dismisses the ‘tyranny of the majority’ 
argument, stressing that it is a term usually employed to denote one’s disagreement with the 
majority on the appropriate scope of rights.25 Such issues, according to Waldron, are better 
resolved through the democratic process, rather than by means of judicial review.26 
While these differing attitudes on the role of the judiciary with regard to minorities refer to 
domestic courts reviewing domestic legislation on the basis of a constitution, similar debates 
arise regarding the European Court of Human Rights, when the Court is called upon to 
determine the protection that will be afforded to minorities under the ECHR. If we are to 
accept27 that the judiciary, and more specifically, an international court, is equipped to provide 
us with definitive solutions to these dilemmas, this, in turn, requires us to address the 
appropriate tools the international judge should employ to fulfil this mandate. In order to 
determine the preferred methods of interpretation the Court should follow, one must take into 
account the need for the Court to provide protection that is ‘practical and effective, not 
theoretical and illusory’,28 but inevitably, weight must also be given to more pragmatic 
considerations. Even the most progressive interpretation of the Convention can have little effect 
if the Contracting Parties do not recognise it as legitimate and are not willing to comply with 
it. EuC thus serves as an optimal ‘legitimising tool’,29 especially in cases in which the Court 
expands the scope of protection traditionally afforded under a Convention right. 
This approach, however, raises serious objections from those who subscribe to the view that 
human rights serve as a counter-majoritarian bulwark to the tyranny of the majority.30 Scholars 
                                                          
Constitution (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996); Stephen Macedo, ‘Against majoritarianism: democratic 
values and institutional design’ (2010) 90 Boston University Law Review 1029-42; Will Kymlicka, Multicultural 
Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), chap. 6; Will Kymlicka (ed.), 
The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
23 ‘[The] protection of human rights—the rights of every individual and every minority group—cannot be left 
only in the hands of the legislature and the executive, which, by their nature, reflect majority opinion’ see Barak, 
‘Foreword’, 21. 
24 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The core of the case against judicial review’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346-406. Murray 
Hunt, Hayley Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds.), Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit 
(London: Hart Publishing, 2015). 
25 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The core of the case against judicial review’, 1405. 
26 Ibid. 
27 This is by no means universally accepted. See, for instance, Richard Bellamy, ‘The democratic qualities of 
courts: a critical analysis of three arguments’ (2013) 49 Representation 333-46, but also Bellamy, ‘The democratic 
legitimacy of international human rights conventions: political constitutionalism and the Hirst Case’, in Andreas 
Føllesdal, Johan Karlsson Schaffer and Geir Ulfstein (eds.), The Legitimacy of International Human Rights 
Regimes: Legal, Political and Philosophical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 
243-71. 
28 Demir and Bakara v. Turkey (Appl. no. 34503/97), Judgment, 12 November 2008, para. 66. 
29 Dzehtsiarou, ‘Does consensus matter?’, 534. 
30 The unsuitability of EuC to effectively protect the rights of minorities and unpopular social groups has been 
discussed extensively in the literature. Benvenisti laments how ‘minority values, hardly reflected in national 
policies, are the main losers’ of the consensus approach and accuses the Court of using this device to eschew 
responsibility from its decisions. Thus, for Benvenisti, the Court ‘falls short of fulfilling the crucial task of 
becoming the external guardian against the tyranny by majorities’ see Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Margin of appreciation, 
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have argued that there is an inherent contradiction in resolving complex issues of legal 
interpretation of a document protecting human rights through a quantitative exercise which 
merely requires the judge to calculate the number of CoE Member States that agree or disagree 
with a specific rights claim advanced by a minority.31 Under such an approach, the degree to 
which Convention protection applies to minorities becomes conditional on the extent of the 
majoritarian bias or the acceptance the minority in question enjoys in Europe. If EuC is applied 
in this rudimentary manner, a minority would essentially be deprived of effective recourse to 
human rights protection, because the institution assigned with the task of protecting the 
minority’s rights, when reaching its decision, will rely on (or, at the very least, take into 
account) the same majoritarian bias from which the group is seeking protection. Particularly 
for groups that have been subjected to unfavourable treatment and have historically withstood 
injustice and discrimination, EuC seems to be a counterproductive tool for determining their 
rights.  
Proponents of EuC argue that a closer inspection of the minority case law of the Court 
demonstrates that these concerns are unjustified.32 EuC is nothing more than an indication in 
favour of one interpretation of the Convention. The Court is cognisant of the limitations of the 
tool and can ‘disregard’33 EuC where there is good reason to do so. Dzehtsiarou contends that 
the fact that minority rights are at stake in a given case provides the Court with a convincing 
justification to use the tool with greater flexibility and to lessen the weight it places on it.34 
When examining the practice of the Court in judgments relating to minorities, Dzehtsiarou 
argues that the Court either does not apply EuC ‘automatically’35 or applies it at the ‘level of 
principles, without requiring the existence of consensus at the level of rules’.36 Dzehtsiarou 
concludes that, in practice, this more creative use of EuC has expanded protection for 
                                                          
consensus, and universal standards’ (1999) 31 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 
843-54 at 851. For Fenwick, ‘reliance on finding a European consensus in socially sensitive contexts can merely 
lead to the acceptance of detrimental treatment of groups traditionally vulnerable to discrimination’, see Helen 
Fenwick, ‘Same sex unions at the Strasbourg Court in a divided Europe: driving forward reform or protecting the 
Court’s authority via consensus analysis’ (2016) European Human Rights Law Review 249-72 at 250. See also 
Holning S. Lau, ‘Rewriting Schalk and Kopf: shifting the locus of deference’, in Eva Brems (ed.), Diversity and 
European Human Rights: Rewriting Judgments of the ECHR (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 
248; George Letsas, ‘Two concepts of the margin of appreciation’ (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705-
32 and George Letsas, ‘The truth in autonomous concepts: how to interpret the ECHR’ (2004) 15 European 
Journal of International Law 279-305. 
31 Underlying this debate is the discussion surrounding positivism, natural law and the theoretical foundations of 
human rights. See indicatively, John Manique, ‘Development, human rights and law’ (1992) 14 Human Rights 
Quarterly 383-408. 
32 Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights, p. 119. 
33 Ibid., p. 124. 
34 Additionally, Dzehtsiarou argues that EuC ‘can be linked to customary norms or to general principles of law’ 
in European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights, p. 6. This suggests that rather 
than being associated with majoritarianism, consensus is a ‘method allowing the Court to identify and recognize 
with its case law the emergence of (regional) custom’, Vassilis Tzevelekos and Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, 
‘International custom making and the ECtHR’s European consensus method of interpretation’ (2016) 16 
European Yearbook of Human Rights 313-44. This hypothesis is difficult to prove, as the Court has not provided 
an authoritative definition of consensus. However, even if it is incorrect to associate consensus with 
majoritarianism in the sense that it represents the will of states or the will of social majorities within them, it 
contains a quantitative dimension in the sense that the court is ‘counting states’ in its effort to determine the 
outcome of the case.  
35 Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights, p. 129.  
36 Ibid., p. 124. 
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minorities rather than diminished it.37 This is attributed to the fact that, in such cases, the Court 
employs the full flexibility associated with the tool, rather than applying it in an automatic and 
rudimentary manner to the issue under examination.38   
Such an approach, if consistently adopted by the Court, can be viewed as a means of bridging 
the gap between the two competing accounts on the appropriate role of EuC in minority cases. 
By retaining the flexibility to lessen the persuasive value of EuC, the Court can ensure that it 
does not produce judgments that are solely informed by the status of European majority opinion 
about the minority. This flexibility of EuC, however, may allow it to still play an ancillary role. 
For instance, the Court can focus on consensus derived through international legal materials to 
reinforce the minority status of the applicants and to narrow the margin of appreciation with 
regard to the impugned measure. This ensures that EuC is used as a nuanced interpretative tool, 
rather than a blunt instrument whereby the Court simply counts states that agree or disagree 
with a specific rights claim advanced by a minority. If EuC serves merely as one of many 
factors that provide guidance as to the scope of a Convention right, then the Court can argue 
that the status of the applicants as members of a minority requires the Court to examine the 
impugned measure in a manner that does not rely solely on what EuC dictates.  
However, even though scholars have identified39 a more flexible approach to the application of 
EuC where minority rights are involved, the Court, in its reasoning in these cases,40 has not 
explicitly stated that it is applying EuC with greater flexibility due to the minority nature of the 
case. The Court has also not exhaustively identified the groups whose minority status justifies 
a departure from the EuC method of interpretation. This is not to say that the Court has 
remained entirely silent on the matter. It has developed some guidance as to the circumstances 
which will allow it to subject an impugned measure against a minority to more intense scrutiny. 
First, in its Article 14 case law, the Court has suggested that differential treatment against 
specific groups solely due to a characteristic they possess constitutes a ‘suspect’ ground of 
discrimination. Suspect grounds include ‘race and ethnic origin, sexual orientation, and […], 
nationality’.41 For such suspect grounds, the Court requires particularly weighty and objective 
reasons to be adduced by the respondent state to justify any differential treatment. Furthermore, 
(and more specifically), in cases relating to discrimination due to sexual orientation, the Court 
has highlighted the need to protect individuals from majoritarian disfavour by noting that 
‘treatment which is grounded upon a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority 
against a homosexual minority’42 is unacceptable under the Convention. Thus, by defining 
                                                          
37 Ibid., p. 120. 
38 Ibid., p. 125. 
39 Ibid., p. 120. 
40 For the ECtHR case law on minorities, see Steven Wheatley, ‘Minorities under the ECHR and the construction 
of a “democratic society”’ (2007) Public Law 770-92; Lourdes Peroni, ‘Minorities before the European Court of 
Human Rights’, in Jane Boulden and Will Kymlicka (eds.), International Approaches to Governing Ethnic 
Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
41 European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination Field, Report written by Olivier de Schutter, 
The Prohibition of Discrimination under European Human Rights Law (European Communities Report, 2011), 
chap. 1, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights’, pp. 16-17.  
42 Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom (Appl. nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96), Judgment, 27 September 1999, 
para. 121; L. and V. v. Austria (Appl. nos. 39392/98 39829/98), Judgment, 9 January 2003, para. 52; Identoba 
and others v. Georgia (Appl. no. 73235/12), Judgment, 12 May 2015.     
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certain grounds of discrimination as suspect and explicitly sheltering certain groups from 
majoritarian bias, the Court suggests that respondent states in cases involving such rights 
claims will be afforded a narrower margin of appreciation.    
How has this been applied in practice in relation to EuC? The subsequent part will demonstrate 
that the Court’s use of EuC in such cases is inconsistent. While in some judgments, the Court 
takes full advantage of the flexibility associated with EuC to strengthen Convention protection 
for minorities and narrow the margin of appreciation, in other cases, EuC is the sole factor the 
Court examines in its reasoning and serves as an impediment to progress on minority rights. 
 
3 Is the Flexibility Associated with Consensus Applied Selectively?  
In light of the flexibility of the EuC tool discussed in the section above, this section will assess 
whether the Court takes full advantage of the ‘space for manoeuvre’43 with which the tool is 
associated. In order to illustrate the disparity in the use of EuC, the chapter focuses on two 
minorities for which the Court has followed fundamentally different approaches. The Court 
has relied on consensus stemming from international legal materials to recognise the minority 
status of Roma people and to narrow the margin of appreciation in Article 14 cases involving 
Roma rights. Crucially, in these judgments, the Court did not apply EuC to the key human 
rights issue it was attempting to resolve. In same-sex marriage judgments, even though the 
Court has identified LGBTI individuals as a sexual minority, EuC on same-sex marriage is the 
sole determining factor upon which the Court relies to examine whether a positive obligation 
to provide for same-sex marriage can be included in the Convention. Both of these case-studies 
will be examined in turn. 
3.1 Discrimination against Roma and European Consensus 
The Court has been particularly vigilant in promoting the rights of Roma people by recognising 
the existence of ‘a positive obligation imposed on the Contracting States by virtue of Article 8 
to facilitate the gypsy way of life’.44 In a series of cases relating to a common issue across 
Europe, the disproportionate placement of Roma children in special schools, either on the 
ground that they have learning disabilities45 or due the fact that they do not have an adequate 
command of the language,46 the Court used consensus creatively to reach its conclusions.   
In the leading case on this matter, D.H. and others v. Czech Republic,47 eighteen Roma 
applicants argued that the excessive number of Roma children found to have learning 
disabilities after taking specialised tests and being subsequently placed in special schools had 
resulted in the uneasy co-existence of ‘two separately organised educational systems, namely 
                                                          
43 Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights, p. 125. 
44 Coster v. the United Kingdom (Appl. no. 24876/94), Judgment, 18 January 2001, para. 110. 
45 D.H. and others v. the Czech Republic (Appl. nos. 57325/00), Judgment, 13 November 2007. 
46 See Orsus and others v. Croatia (Appl. no. 15766/03), Judgment, 16 March 2010. For further commentary, see 
indicatively, Iryna Ulasiuk, ‘To segregate or not to segregate? Educational rights of the Roma children in the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2014) EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2014/29; Danisi Carmelo, ‘How 
far can the European Court of Human Rights go in the fight against discrimination? Defining new standards in its 
non-discrimination jurisprudence’ (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 793-807. 
47 D.H. and others v. the Czech Republic (Appl. nos. 57325/00), Judgment, 13 November 2007. 
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special schools for the Roma and “ordinary” primary schools for the majority of the 
population’.48 
At first instance, in the Chamber judgment49 of the case, the Court followed a deferential 
approach, noting that the planning of a curriculum in the sphere of education ‘may legitimately 
vary according to the country’.50 This supported the idea that a wide margin of appreciation 
applied to the case.51 The Court noted that ‘states cannot be prohibited from setting up different 
types of school for children with difficulties or implementing special educational programmes 
to respond to special needs’.52 The Court concluded that the impugned policy of the state could 
not be viewed as discriminatory under Article 14 and Article 2 of Protocol 1, and no violation 
was found.  
After the applicants successfully referred the case to the Grand Chamber (GC), the respondent 
government, seeking to replicate the Court’s approach in the Chamber judgment, relied heavily 
on EuC when presenting its arguments to the Court. In determining the scope of state 
obligations under Article 2 Protocol 1, the Czech government argued that: 
No European standard or consensus currently existed regarding the criteria to be used 
to determine whether children should be placed in special schools or how children with 
special learning needs should be educated.53 
The respondent government argued that in line with the Court’s use of EuC, this lack of 
consensus should allow for a wide margin of appreciation. 
The GC was not convinced by the government’s arguments and took an altogether different 
approach, distancing itself from the Chamber judgment. Instead of focusing on the lack of 
common ground between CoE Member States in relation to special schools as the Chamber 
had done, the GC noted the ‘emerging international consensus among the Contracting States 
of the Council of Europe recognising the special needs of minorities and an obligation to protect 
their security, identity and lifestyle’.54 In defining what this international consensus consisted 
of, the Court referenced its previous judgment in Chapman v. the United Kingdom,55 in which 
it relied on soft law instruments from the CoE and beyond56 to confirm its recognition of the 
                                                          
48 See legal summary of the case available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{‘itemid’:[‘002-2439’]} . 
49 D.H. and others v. the Czech Republic (Appl. nos. 57325/00), Judgment, 7 February 2006. 
50 Ibid., para. 47. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid., para. 155. 
54 Ibid., para. 181. See also ‘the Court stated that there was international consensus on the issue that minority 
rights should be properly protected and it placed less emphasis on the fact that there was no European consensus 
among laws and practices of the Contracting Parties to the ECHR’, Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the 
Legitimacy of the ECtHR, p. 125. 
55 (Appl. No 27238/95), Judgment, 18 January 2001. 
56 The materials the Court relied on in Chapman were The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (1995), Recommendation 1203 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly on 
Gypsies in Europe, and, going beyond the COE sphere, an EU Resolution on the situation of Gypsies in the 
Community, and reports of the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the High Commissioner 
on National Minorities of the OSCE. See para. 93 cross referencing to paras. 55-9. In Sampani and others v. 
Greece, para. 76, the Court also mentions that ‘as evidenced by the activities of numerous European and 
international bodies […], this protection [to Roma children] also extends to the field of education’ (original text 
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special status of the Roma people as a minority. This shift from EuC on educational systems to 
international consensus on the status of Roma people as a group worthy of ‘special protection’57 
was not a significant departure for the Court, as it has often gone beyond searching for a 
‘common regional perspective’,58 namely ‘counting’ CoE States that agree or disagree with a 
specific human rights proposition, to take into consideration norms of public international law 
as evidenced through international treaties, soft law instruments or UN Documents.59 This led 
the Court to argue that ‘as a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting the Roma 
have become a specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority’.60 After finding that 
there was indirect discrimination in this instance, the Court concluded that the ‘burden of proof 
must therefore shift to the Government, which must show that the difference in the impact of 
the legislation was the result of objective factors unrelated to ethnic origin’.61 Not being able 
to produce such convincing evidence, the Czech Republic was found in violation of Article 14 
in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol 1. 
The historical injustice the Roma people have withstood is also featured heavily in the Court’s 
subsequent case law. In the cases of Sampanis and others v. Greece,62 Oršuš and others v. 
Croatia,63 Sampani and others v. Greece64 and Horvath and Kiss v. Hungary,65 the Court 
forwent a detailed EuC-based analysis, which would have required it to thoroughly engage 
with the practices across Europe in relation to the education of children of Roma origin and 
relied on the minority status of the applicants to narrow the margin of appreciation. 
In Horvath and Kiss, for instance, the Court noted that ‘the misplacement of Roma children in 
special schools has a long history across Europe.’66 Reference was made to EuC when 
examining the notion of the ‘respect’ states must afford when discharging their obligations 
under Article 2 Protocol 1. The Court noted: 
[T]he requirements of the notion of ‘respect’ […] vary considerably from case to case, 
given the diversity of the practices followed and the situations obtaining in the 
Contracting States. As a result, the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the 
                                                          
in French, translated by the author). The Court identifies this consensus as international, rather than EuC, 
throughout its subsequent case law relating to Roma people. See indicatively Orsus, para. 148, Sampanis and 
others v. Greece, para. 73, Sampani and others v. Greece, para. 76. 
57 D.H. and others, para. 182. 
58 Adamantia Rachovitsa, ‘Fragmentation of international law revisited: insights, good practices, and lessons to 
be learned from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 863, 869. 
59 On this, see indicatively Vassilis P. Tzevelekos, ‘The use of article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the case law of the 
ECtHR: an effective anti-fragmentation tool or a selective loophole for the reinforcement of human rights 
teleology?’ (2010) Michigan Journal of International Law 621-90; Helfer, ‘Consensus’, 133. 
60 D.H. and others, para. 182. 
61 Ibid., para. 195. 
62 (Appl. no. 32526/05), Judgment, 5 June 2008, para. 69. 
63 (Appl. no. 15766/03), Judgment, 16 March 2010, para. 148. 
64 (Appl. no. 59608/09), Judgment, 11 December 2012. 
65 Horvath and Kiss v. Hungary (Appl. no. 11146/11), Judgment, 29 January 2013. 
66 Ibid., para. 115.  
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Convention with due regard to the needs and resources of the community and of 
individuals.67 
This wide margin of appreciation, however, is immediately mitigated in the subsequent 
paragraph of the judgment. Instead of further developing its EuC analysis, the Court ties the 
obligations owed to the applicants to the historical injustices Roma people have suffered. As 
the Court stresses: 
In the context of the right to education of members of groups which suffered past 
discrimination in education with continuing effects, structural deficiencies call for the 
implementation of positive measures in order, inter alia, to assist the applicants with 
any difficulties they encountered in following the school curriculum. These obligations 
are particularly stringent where there is an actual history of direct discrimination. 
Therefore, some additional steps are needed in order to address these problems.68 
In its subsequent analysis,69 the Court does not mention the wide margin or EuC, focusing 
instead on the blatant overrepresentation of Roma children in special schools and the historical 
disadvantages they have suffered in their access to education. Thus, and conversely to same-
sex marriage judgments, which will be considered in the next section of this chapter, the wide 
margin of appreciation on the placement of children with learning difficulties in special schools 
dictated by EuC analysis ‘surrenders’ to the special status of Roma people as a vulnerable 
group with a history of stigmatisation.70  
Thus, three important points emerge from this analysis. First, in this set of judgments, the Court 
moves away from EuC and the wide margin of appreciation in relation to the impugned 
measure of the respondent state. Second, it derives the legitimacy to do this from the status of 
the applicants as members of a minority group and relies on international consensus to 
determine this status. The wide margin of appreciation dictated by the absence of EuC yields 
when confronted with the internationally accepted situation of stigmatisation of the Roma 
people and allows the Court to exercise intense scrutiny of the impugned measure by requiring 
additional steps from the respondent state and by narrowing the margin of appreciation. Third, 
these additional steps mean that, in the stricto sensu proportionality stage of the analysis, the 
state is expected to produce particularly cogent reasons to justify its differential treatment of 
the applicants in line with the case law on Article 14 ECHR. Dzehtsiarou relies on these cases 
to suggest that ‘the fact that the case is related to minority rights offers the Court some space 
for manoeuvre’ in its application of EuC.71 The Court seems to fully take advantage of this 
flexibility in these judgments.  
                                                          
67 Ibid., para. 103. 
68 Ibid., para. 104 (emphasis added). 
69 Ibid., paras. 109-29. 
70 The fact that a violation was found even though the Czech Republic was ahead of many other European Member 
States was commented on in the dissenting judgment of judge Zupancic, who pointed out that ‘[a]s the majority 
[stated] explicitly, and implicitly elsewhere in the judgment, […] the Czech Republic is the only Contracting State 
which has in fact tackled the special-educational troubles of Roma children. It then borders on the absurd to find 
the Czech Republic in violation of anti-discrimination principles. In other words, this ‘violation’ would never 
have happened had the respondent State approached the problem with benign neglect’. 
71 Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights, p. 125. 
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As the following part will demonstrate, exactly the opposite points can be made in relation to 
the Court’s same-sex marriage case-law. 
3.2 The Use of European Consensus in Same-sex Marriage Cases 
The Court has had to contend with applicants who sought to challenge, among other issues, the 
lack of provision for same-sex marriage in their respondent states. The challenges were brought 
under Article 14 ECHR on the prohibition of discrimination in conjunction with Articles 8 and 
12. The chapter will examine the response of the Court and will address the following 
questions. First, what was the weight placed on EuC? Second, did the status of the applicants 
as members of a ‘sexual minority’72 have any effect on narrowing the wide margin of 
appreciation dictated by the absence of EuC? Third, and turning to the Article 14 ECHR 
component of the judgments, how did EuC interact with the duty to provide weighty reasons 
for differential treatment of the applicants?  
3.2.1 What Was the Weight Placed on the EuC Argument? 
In Schalk and Kopf, the applicants sought permission from the Austrian authorities to marry. 
After the authorities refused, they challenged the refusal, relying on Articles 8, 12 and 14 
ECHR. The Court initially relied on textual interpretation to determine whether the scope of 
Article 12 ECHR could include same-sex marriage. An obvious obstacle was the reference in 
Article 12 to ‘men and women’73 as opposed to ‘everyone’ or ‘no one’, which is found in other 
ECHR Articles. This pointed towards the fact that when the Convention was drafted, there was 
no intention of including same-sex couples in the ambit of Article 12.74 Ultimately, by making 
reference to Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which 
abandoned reference to ‘men and women’, the Court took an important step and declared that 
the Court ‘no longer consider[s] that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all 
circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite sex. Consequently, 
it cannot be said that Article 12 is inapplicable to the applicants’ complaint’.75. 
When it came to determining, however, whether this generated a positive obligation to allow 
same-sex marriages, the Court relied exclusively on EuC. Since only six out of forty-seven 
member-states allowed for same-sex marriage at the time, the lack of consensus did not allow 
the Court to proceed further. Thus, it found no violation of Article 12. Similar conclusions were 
reached when the Court examined the argument under Articles 14 and 8 ECHR. The Court 
noted that ‘there is not yet a majority of States providing for legal recognition of same-sex 
couples’,76 and therefore, it did not proceed to the proportionality stage of its inquiry. 
                                                          
72 The court confirmed that LGBT individuals constitute a sexual minority most recently in Bayev and others v. 
Russia (Appl. no. 67667/09 44092/12 56717/12), Judgment, 20 June 2017, para. 66-7.  
73 Shalk and Kopf, paras. 54-5. 
74 Ibid. Johnson challenges this interpretation of the Convention, saying that the use of ‘men and women of a 
marriageable age’ was added to ensure the equality of the spouses and to promote the right of women to enter 
marriages by their own free will. See Paul Johnson, ‘The choice of wording must be regarded as deliberate: same-
sex marriage and article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2015) 40 European Law Review 207-
24. 
75 Shalk and Kopf, para. 61. See also Loveday Hodson, ‘A marriage by any other name? Schalk and Kopf v Austria’ 
(2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 170-9. 
76 Shalk and Kopf, para. 105. 
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In Hämäläinen v. Finland, the Court confirmed the approach it had taken with regard to Article 
12 in Schalk and Kopf. The applicant had undergone gender re-assignment surgery. She 
complained that she could not have her identification documents changed to reflect her gender 
without transforming her marriage to her partner to a civil partnership, as same-sex marriage 
was not recognised in Finland. The third-party interveners in the case attempted to steer the 
Court away from regional consensus and towards broader international developments on same-
sex marriage.77 They argued that ‘human rights treaties should, as far as possible, be interpreted 
in harmony in order to give rise to a single set of compatible obligations’.78 They further noted 
that in most instances worldwide, whenever there were similar judicial challenges, ‘the 
adjudicating bodies concluded that the States had not put forward reasonable, convincing, 
objective or weighty arguments to justify discrimination against individuals on grounds of their 
sexual orientation’.79 After the Court noted the lack of EuC on the matter, it argued that the 
applicable margin of appreciation would be wide.80 It subsequently focused its analysis on the 
fact that the applicant and her wife would not lose any significant rights if their marriage was 
converted into a civil partnership.81 The lack of EuC on the matter was once again central to 
this outcome. 
Finally, in Oliari and others v. Italy, the applicants challenged both the fact that they were 
barred from entering a civil union and that they were unable to marry. While the Court 
recognised the existence of a positive duty on states to provide some form of legal recognition 
to same-sex couples, its stance on Article 12 did not alter. The third-party interveners had 
provided the Court with detailed information on the progress of same-sex marriage outside 
Europe in the period between the Schalk and Kopf judgment and the present case. They urged 
the judges to follow the approach in Goodwin v. UK,82 in which the Court had relied on a 
‘continuing international trend’83 rather than on EuC analysis to determine that post-operative 
transsexuals had a right to marry under Article 12. The applicants stressed that after the Court’s 
recent acceptance in Schalk and Kopf of the applicability of Article 12 to same-sex couples, a 
refusal to allow same-sex couples to marry ‘only continued to marginalise and stigmatise a 
minority group in favour of a majority with discriminatory tendencies’.84 This did not seem to 
convince the Court in relation to the Article 12 component of the case. In a few short 
paragraphs, the Court reiterated its commitment to EuC85 and (in an arguably regressive step 
after Schalk and Kopf) found the Articles 12 and 14 ECHR aspects of the case inadmissible as 
manifestly ill-founded.  
3.2.2 Did the Minority Status of the Applicants Affect the Margin of Appreciation? 
                                                          
77 Hämäläinen, para. 54. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid., paras. 74-5. 
81 Ibid., para. 84. 
82 Goodwin v. United Kingdom (Appl. no. 28957/95), Judgment, 11 July 2002.  
83 Ibid., paras. 84-5. 
84 Oliari, para. 190. 
85 Oliari, para. 192. 
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The Court has accepted that LGBT individuals constitute a ‘sexual minority’86 and that ‘sexual 
orientation is a concept covered by Article 14’.87 In relation to differential treatment of LGBTQ 
individuals, the Court has also clarified that the State’s margin of appreciation is narrow’,88 
while emphasising that ‘differences based solely on considerations of sexual orientation are 
unacceptable under the Convention’.89 At the same time, the Court identifies a wide margin 
where there is ‘no consensus within the member States of the Council of Europe, either as to 
the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it, 
particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues’.90  
Therefore, cases such as the ones relating to same-sex marriage illustrate the complicated 
exercise the Court has to perform in determining the appropriate margin of appreciation when 
it is faced with contradictory standards as to the appropriate intensity of review.91 The 
differential treatment of same-sex couples due to their sexual orientation points to a narrow 
margin, while the moral and ethical issues raised by same-sex marriage suggest a wide margin 
of appreciation. In previous cases, where the Court had to examine a claim representing a 
similar conflict, namely in applications relating to second-parent adoption among same-sex 
couples, the Court categorically was in favour of narrowing the margin.92 The approach is 
different in same-sex marriage cases. Without much by way of explanation, the Court seems 
to suggest that, in examining same-sex marriage, the wide margin on ethical and moral issues 
dictated by EuC overrides the narrow margin that is to be applied when there is a difference in 
treatment due to sexual orientation.  
In the Oliari case especially, the claimants employed arguments that sought to emphasise the 
minority aspects of the case and the historic injustices suffered by LGBTQ people by making 
references to the case law that has shone a light on the special and discriminatory circumstances 
faced by the LGBTQ community in general.93 They asserted that this stigmatisation of the 
LGBTQ community, when viewed in conjunction with the Court’s long-held assertion that 
states would have a very narrow margin of appreciation when treating individuals differently 
solely due to their sexual orientation, should allow the Court to find violations of Articles 12 
and 14 ECHR.94 These arguments, however, did not alter the Court’s approach.  
                                                          
86 Bayev, paras. 66-7. 
87 Vallianatos and others v. Greece (Appl. no. 29381/09 and 32684/09), Judgment, 7 November 2013, para. 77. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Oliari, para. 162. 
91 On contradictory intensity of review determining standards, see Janneke H. Gerards, ‘Intensity of judicial 
review in equal treatment cases’ (2004) 51 Netherlands International Law Review 135-83 at 154. 
92 ‘The Court observes that the breadth of the State’s margin of appreciation under Article 8 of the Convention 
depends on a number of factors. Where a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at 
stake, the margin allowed to the State will normally be restricted. Where, however, there is no consensus within 
the member States of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the 
best means of protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the margin will be 
wider […] However, the Court reaffirms that when it comes to issues of discrimination on the grounds of sex or 
sexual orientation to be examined under Article 14, the State’s margin of appreciation is narrow’. X and others v. 
Austria, para. 148. 
93 Reference was made to X and Others v. Austria (Appl. no. 19010/07), Judgment, 19 February 2013 and X v. 
Turkey (Appl. no. 24626/09), Judgment, 9 October 2012. 
94 Oliari, para. 190. 
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This refusal of the Court to effectively engage with the status of LGBTQ individuals as a sexual 
minority is surprising. The Court has relied on this status specifically to shield LGBTQ 
individuals from unfavourable majoritarian preferences in a variety of other cases relating to 
discrimination. For instance, in the recent case of Bayev v. Russia,95 in which the applicants 
challenged the compatibility with the Convention of laws barring the ‘promotion’ of 
homosexuality or non-traditional sexual relations among minors, the Court clarified that 
it would be incompatible with the underlying values of the Convention if the exercise 
of Convention rights by a minority group were made conditional on its being accepted 
by the majority.96 
The Court in this case was attempting to counter the Russian government’s argument that the 
‘homosexual propaganda’ law enjoyed widespread support across Russia. This majoritarian 
preference in Russia had no bearing, according to the Strasbourg judges, on the exercise of the 
right under examination. Therefore, the Court in Bayev was referring to internal consensus 
rather than to EuC.97 But its point on the appropriate stance the Court should take when the 
rights of LGBTQ individuals are at stake highlights the dangers of any interpretative tool that 
involves taking majoritarian preferences into account when determining the scope of 
minorities’ Convention rights. An attempt at such an analysis is not featured in the Article 12 
ECHR cases discussed above. Thus, the Court misses an opportunity to rely on the nature of 
LGBTQ individuals as a sexual minority to justify departing from (or supplementing its) EuC 
analysis. 
3.2.3 Consensus and the Duty to Give Weighty Justifications for Differential Treatment 
under Article 14 ECHR 
As discussed in the introduction, especially ‘suspect’98 grounds of discrimination, such as 
discrimination based on sexual orientation,99 require the state to produce particularly weighty 
reasons for differential treatment of a specific group. The Court has required100 respondent 
states to produce such reasons as far as the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil 
partnerships is concerned, but, due to the lack of EuC, does not proceed to that stage of inquiry 
when examining same-sex marriage, even though this engages both Articles 8 and 12 ECHR. 
The dissenting judges in Schalk and Kopf pointed out this issue in relation to Articles 14 and 8 
ECHR, while also distancing themselves from the majority’s reliance on EuC. Because the 
Court had followed through with the formula it relies on in discrimination cases having 
identified a ‘relevantly similar situation’101 and noting that ‘differences based on sexual 
orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification’,102 the dissenting judges 
                                                          
95 Bayev and others v. Russia (Appl. no. 67667/09 44092/12 56717/12), Judgment, 20 June 2017. 
96 Ibid., para. 70. 
97 In the judgment, EuC was favourable to the applicants and taken into account by the Court. 
98 See Ilias Tripsiotis, ‘Discrimination and civil partnerships: taking ‘legal’ out of legal recognition’ (2014) 14 
Human Rights Law Review, 343, 347. 
99 Ibid. 
100 See Vallianatos and others, paras. 80-92. 
101 Schalk and Kopf, para. 99. 
102 Ibid., para. 97. 
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disagreed with the majority opinion for not following through with the next step of the Article 
14 analysis, namely the duty to give reasons. As they noted: 
[T]he existence or non-existence of common ground between the laws of the 
Contracting States’ […] is irrelevant as such considerations are only a subordinate basis 
for the application of the concept of the margin of appreciation. Indeed, it is only in the 
event that the national authorities offer grounds for justification that the Court can be 
satisfied, taking into account the presence or the absence of a common approach, that 
they are better placed than it is to deal effectively with the matter.103 
With this in mind, and returning to the three main questions posed in the beginning of this 
section, namely the significance of EuC to the outcome of the case, the weight placed on the 
minority status of the applicants when examining the same-sex marriage case-law, and the 
relationship between consensus and the duty to give reasons, the following conclusions can be 
reached. First, the Court, when examining the existence of a positive obligation to provide 
same-sex marriage, ties its analysis solely to EuC and does not engage with international 
documents, international trends or other methods of interpretation to complement its EuC 
analysis.104 Second, the fact that the Court is examining the rights of a sexual minority does 
not convince the judges to shield the applicants from an unfavourable EuC and to seek 
alternative methods of interpretation or to employ EuC with greater flexibility. Thus, the 
narrow margin the Court grants when examining differences in treatment based on sexual 
orientation surrenders to the wide margin dictated by the absence of EuC. Finally, the reliance 
on what the EuC analysis dictates bars the judges from proceeding to the proportionality stage 
to require the respondent states to provide reasons for the differential treatment the applicants 
experience in the Article 14 ECHR component of the case.  
With this in mind, the following part will address this discrepancy in the case law in relation 
to how the minority status of the applicant affects the application of EuC. 
 
4 When to Apply Consensus in Minority Cases 
The chapter in its examination of these two case studies has aimed to identify and contrast two 
conflicting approaches that lead to an inconsistency in the application of EuC to minorities. 
This section will argue for a more coherent and uniform approach and present the options the 
Court could follow when applying EuC to minorities. Additionally, it will address a potential 
objection to the arguments advanced in the chapter.  
4.1 Consensus, Minorities and the Role of the Court 
                                                          
103 Schalk and Kopf, dissenting opinion of judges Rozakis, Spielmann and Jebens. 
104 The dissenting judges in Hämäläinen attempted such an interpretation by making reference to the Yogyakarta 
Principles (see International Commission of Jurists, Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International 
Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, March 2007, available at 
www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.htm), along with ‘recent judgments of the Constitutional Courts of 
Austria, Germany and Italy’. See joint dissenting opinion of Judges Sajo, Keller and Lemmens, para. 16. 
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Judgments such as the ones discussed in the chapter illustrate the tightrope exercise the Court 
must perform when defining the scope of contested rights of minority groups, especially where 
it is asked to provide solutions to sensitive moral and ethical dilemmas that divide European 
societies. Any outcome in such cases is bound to generate criticism, either on the basis that the 
Court was activist and arbitrarily increased the obligations of the Contracting Parties to the 
Convention, or conversely, on the ground that it did not provide adequate protection to 
effectively address the plight of the applicants. The chapter argues that the use of EuC in the 
cases presented sends mixed messages as to the capacity of the Court to advance human rights 
protection for minorities and to reverse discriminatory practices against them across Europe.  
The approach to EuC which the Court employs in its same-sex marriage case law suggests that 
any progress on minority rights should first take place at the domestic level. This is in line with 
the Court’s subsidiary nature and demonstrates self-awareness as to the limits of international 
human rights supervision. In this scenario, EuC serves as a tool to track progress across Europe. 
By tying progress on same-sex marriage to EuC, the Court is implicitly suggesting that once a 
majority of states in the CoE recognise same-sex marriage, it will begin to reconsider its 
approach and potentially find the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry 
discriminatory. This matter, however, is one for the Contracting Parties to decide, at least until 
that point in time when sufficient EuC105 is reached in favour of same-sex marriage. Until this 
occurs, the Court will refrain from interpreting the Convention in a manner that will expand 
the obligations of the Contracting Parties. The application of EuC is largely unaffected by the 
minority status of the applicants, even though the Court has accepted in its case law that they 
belong to a group that requires protection from majoritarian bias.  
Under this understanding of consensus, any progress on minority rights in the Court’s case law 
is inextricably linked to majoritarian consent as expressed through EuC. This approach is one 
in which the Court views itself as ‘an institution that merely implements legal norms and not 
as an institution that pushes its own political agenda’.106 In a hypothetical scenario in which 
such majoritarian consent to a minority right is subsequently withdrawn,107 the justification for 
the expansion of the right disappears. It would then be up to the Court to determine whether 
Convention protection will concomitantly regress, or whether the ‘new’ standard will remain 
embedded in the ECHR regardless of whether the majority of states continue to support it.108  
                                                          
105 In Schalk and Kopf, the Court explained that ‘there is not yet a majority of States providing for legal recognition 
of same-sex couples’, para. 105. This implies that when twenty-four or twenty-five states legalise same-sex 
marriage, EuC will be in favour of the applicants. In spite of what its name implies, EuC is not meant to be 
understood as a consensus of all forty-seven Member States on a specific matter. A mere majority or a ‘trend’ 
suffices for the Court to ascertain that consensus exists. On this, see Fenwick, ‘Same sex unions’, 252. 
106 Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights, p. 6. 
107 Concerns have been expressed as to the progress being made in LGBTI rights across Europe, see Nils 
Muižnieks, ‘The long march against homophobia and transphobia’ (Council of Europe, The Commissioner’s 
Human Rights Comments), available at www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/the-long-march-against-
homophobia-and-transphobia?inheritRedirect=true&redirect=%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fcommissioner%2Fthematic-
work%2FLGBTI.  
108 Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) (Appl. no. 126/05), Judgment, 22 May 2012 and Hutchinson v. the United Kingdom 
(Appl. no. 57592/08), Judgment, 17 January 2017 are recent examples in which the Court is arguably regressing 
with regards to the protection it offers. 
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The alternative approach is one in which the Court signals that it will assign lesser persuasive 
value to EuC, or at least engage with it creatively by taking advantage of the flexibility of the 
tool where minority rights are involved. This is the approach to EuC the Court demonstrated 
in the Roma cases discussed in the chapter. A multitude of international legal materials were 
employed to identify an international consensus on the status of Roma as a minority in need of 
special Convention protection. This was a necessary step which provided the Court with the 
justification to reverse widespread discriminatory practices against Roma children across 
Europe. The Court, in its assessment of the applicants’ claim, did not compare how each 
Contracting Party arranges access to educational institutions for Roma pupils, in spite of being 
prompted to do so by the respondent government, nor did it examine the educational practices 
for students with special learning requirements across Europe.  
This approach does not discard consensus-based interpretation altogether. The outcome in 
these judgments relies partly on consensus derived from international legal materials. The role 
of consensus, however, in addressing the issue raised by the applicants, is complemented by a 
rigorous and in-depth examination of the justifications the state advances to explain the 
difference in treatment. The outcome of the case is thus not tied to EuC on the impugned 
measure. The Court reaches its conclusion on the basis that the reasons on which the respondent 
state relied to explain the differential treatment of the applicants did not withstand judicial 
scrutiny. International consensus merely served to reinforce the status of the applicants as a 
minority. This, in turn, serves as the justification for the Court to narrow what would have 
otherwise been a wide margin of appreciation. 
This highlights a significant drawback of the approach in same-sex marriage cases in which 
the minority status of the applicants is wholly irrelevant to the application of EuC. The lack of 
consensus on the existence of a positive obligation regarding same-sex marriage does not allow 
the Court to proceed to the next stage of its inquiry under Article 14 ECHR. As the Court does 
not identify the existence of such a positive obligation, it does not examine the respondent 
state’s purported justifications for this differential treatment. Article 14 cases require the 
respondent state to produce weighty reasons to justify any differential treatment to which the 
applicants are subjected with regard to the enjoyment of a right. The Court’s analysis in its 
same-sex marriage judgments reflects that there has been little progress on this matter in 
European societies, but by not proceeding to the proportionality stage, the Court cannot address 
why such a consensus exists. It does not evaluate whether practices of excluding same-sex 
couples from the right to marry reflect ‘bias on behalf of a heterosexual majority’109 against a 
group that has historically withstood discrimination, nor does it examine the validity of the 
reasons states have provided to exclude same-sex couples from marriage. By not reaching the 
stricto sensu proportionality stage of its analysis to detect and assess the underlying reasons 
behind the exclusion, the Court seems satisfied that excluding same-sex couples from marriage 
is a lawful practice from the viewpoint of the Convention on the basis that the Contracting 
Parties inform the Court that a right to same-sex marriage does not exist. This deprives the 
                                                          
109 Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, para. 121. 
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applicants of the opportunity to contest before the Court the reasons put forward to exclude 
them from the enjoyment of the right. 
This approach may not be objectionable if one views the Court as an institution that should 
only passively implement the legal norms that the Contracting Parties to the Convention 
generate for it. It is vital, however, for the Court to build a more coherent approach in relation 
to minority cases, rather than to oscillate between a passive and a seemingly more activist 
stance where minority rights are involved. If the Court accepts the need to narrow the margin 
where suspect grounds of discrimination are involved, a clearer test must be developed to 
identify the appropriate relationship between EuC and minority protection. 
4.2 Addressing Potential Objections 
Dzehtsiarou argues that the discrepancy regarding the weight the Court places on EuC in Roma 
cases compared to same-sex marriage cases is justifiable. As he contends, in the Roma 
judgments, the lack of a common approach allowed the Court to seek ‘a clearer guideline’,110 
namely to go beyond EuC to examine international consensus as evidenced through other 
international legal materials. Conversely, in same sex-marriage cases, a clear consensus against 
same sex-marriage exists in Europe. This limits the available avenues for the Court. Thus, ‘the 
addition of a new right to the Convention, [the right of same-sex couples to marry] could hardly 
be justified at that point in time’.111 Therefore, according to this analysis, lack of consensus 
should be distinguished from existing consensus against a specific interpretation of the 
Convention when determining the weight the Court should place on the overall EuC argument. 
According to this approach, existing EuC against a specific interpretation adds weight to the 
persuasive value of EuC.  
A different approach is defended in this chapter. First, if we are to accept (as Dzehtsiarou seems 
to accept)112 that the fact that the Court is examining a case relating to minority rights provides 
the Court with the justification to use EuC with greater flexibility, it should be irrelevant 
whether the Court diagnoses an existence or lack of EuC on the impugned measure. When 
examining the scope of minority rights under the prism of EuC, there is greater likelihood a 
consensus will exist against the minority. For instance, as discussed in the analysis above, in 
Horvath and Kiss, the Court noted that ‘the misplacement of Roma children in special schools 
has a long history across Europe’.113 It did not, however, interpret this continuous 
discriminatory treatment as a form of EuC against the participation of Roma children in the 
mainstream education school system. This point was instead used to further justify the need to 
narrow the margin of appreciation of the respondent state. Similarly, historically, European 
states have exposed same-sex couples to various forms of differential treatment. This, in itself, 
should have little significance to the Article 14 ECHR argument unless cogent justifications 
are presented as to why any exclusion from the enjoyment of a right satisfies the test of 
proportionality.  
                                                          
110 Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights, p. 127. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid.  
113 Horvath and Kiss v. Hungary, para. 115. 
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Second, it is true that EuC analysis is crucial where a ‘new right’ is added to the Convention. 
EuC ‘anchors’114 the Court when expanding state obligations under the Convention by ensuring 
that this expansion is not conducted in an arbitrary manner. The Court, however, has already 
accepted that same-sex marriage falls within the ambit of Articles 8 and 12.115 Therefore, it is 
merely determining whether an existing right, the right to marry (whose ambit per the Court 
cannot ‘in all circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite 
sex’),116 can justifiably generate a positive obligation in the Contracting Parties. While a 
pronouncement that states have a Convention-based duty to provide recognition to same-sex 
marriage would certainly constitute a novel interpretation of the Convention, the Court is 
applying evolutive interpretation to extend an existing right to a recognised minority that has 
traditionally been excluded from it and has withstood various forms of discrimination. It is 
questionable whether this justifies the application of EuC in such a rudimentary manner. 
There are also ample examples in the case-law of the Court demonstrating that in cases in which 
the scope of LGBTQ rights was under challenge, EuC against the applicant’s claim did not bar 
the Court from proceeding to the proportionality stage of its analysis and examining the 
cogency of the reasons submitted by the state to justify differential treatment. For instance, 
E.B. v. France117 and X and others v. Austria118 are examples of cases involving discrimination 
against LGBT individuals (namely their inability to adopt children), which required an 
evolutive interpretation of the Convention119 and in which there was clear EuC against the 
applicants’ claim.120 In both cases, however, the Court did not rely exclusively on this EuC to 
determine the outcome of the case. It fully engaged with and thoroughly examined the 
justifications presented by the respondent states and found them lacking.121 
In light of these observations, the chapter will provide a summary of the main points by way 
of a conclusion. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The chapter set out to examine the impact of the applicant’s minority status on the use of the 
EuC method of interpretation. In doing so, the chapter identified inconsistencies in the Court’s 
application of EuC between different minorities. Whereas the Court took advantage of the full 
                                                          
114 Robert Wintemute, ‘Consensus is the right approach for the European court of human rights’ (Guardian.com, 
12 August 2010) available at www.theguardian.com/law/2010/aug/12/european-court-human-rights-consensus. 
115 Schalk and Kopf, para. 61. 
116 Ibid. 
117 (Appl. no. 43546/02), Judgment, 22 January 2008. 
118 (Appl. no. 19010/07), Judgment, 19 February 2013. 
119 See E.B. v. France, para. 46 and X and other v. Austria, para. 139. 
120 In E.B v. France, the respondent government noted that ‘only nine out of forty-six member States of the Council 
of Europe’ had moved towards adoption by same-sex couples, and many countries did not make adoption available 
to single persons at all, para. 65. In X and others v. Austria, rather than relying on a sample of all European states, 
consensus was construed very narrowly by including only states that allowed second parent adoption. The sample 
was considered too narrow for consensus to be a determining factor in the outcome of the case, para. 149.  
121 Even in judgments involving adoption by LGBT individuals in which the Court did not find a violation of the 
consensus, the structured test of Article 14 was followed where this was applicable. See for instance, Gas and 
Dubois v. France (Appl. no. 25951/07), Judgment, 15 March 2012; Fretté v. France (Appl. no. 36515/97), 
Judgment,  26 February 2002. 
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potential of the flexibility associated with EuC to resolve conflicts as to the appropriate scope 
of Roma rights and their equal access to education, it exhibited a much more deferential 
approach in same-sex marriage cases. In the latter set of judgments, the minority status of the 
applicants seems to have no bearing on the manner in which EuC was applied. The chapter 
argues that the relationship between EuC and the minority status of the applicant must be better 
defined and more consistently applied across judgments that relate to minority rights. This will 
assist in further clarifying the role the Court reserves for itself in relation to minority protection 
across Europe and the fight against discrimination. Finally, if the Court accepts some value in 
limiting the role of EuC in minority cases, the nature of EuC (namely whether there is an 
existing consensus, or conversely, no consensus in relation to a specific rights claim) should 
not alter the Court’s approach in applying this method of interpretation. 
 
